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Abstract 
In this paper, we propose a Security Center (SC) to provide a secure environment for Live Virtual Machine (VM) 
migration which is defined as the movement of a virtual machine from one physical host to another. In the cloud systems, 
the migration has appeared based on the need of transferring VMs among resources. At most, researchers have focused on 
the performance of migration process; whereas the security aspects in migration have not been fully explored. So, we 
show how our proposed mechanism analyzes and fulfills the major security requirements for secure live VM migration in 
cloud environments to become protected against different types of passive and active attacks. 
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Virtualization technology was introduced in the late of 
1960s by IBM[1]. Virtualization is defined as the 
abstraction of hardware resources to facilitate the sharing 
of resources well. So, virtualization helps enterprises 
reduce investments and operational cost. The term of 
virtualization means the ability to run entire virtual 
machine components, including the Guest Operating 
System (VMs), on another operating system called Host 
Operating System. The Hypervisor is the layer of software 
that emulates the hardware interface seen by the VM. The 
hypervisor completely controls system resources.  
Virtual Migration (VM) migration is defined as the 
movement of virtual machine from one physical host to 
another. In the cloud environment, the VM live migration 
is introduced to obtain multiple benefits which mainly 
include high availability, hardware maintenance, fault 
takeover and workload balancing. 
The unsecured live VM migration may open up the 
security risks and exposure for not only the migrated VM 
but also for other guest OSes running on that physical 
server. So, There is an intensive need for researching on 
security issues of the live migration process in the cloud.  
In this paper, we highlight a number of proposed 
mechanisms for secure live migration and discuss the 
advantages and disadvantages of each one. Then, we show 
how our proposed mechanisms satisfies all security 
requirements and treats most attacks on live VM process; 
however, our suggested solution with Security Center (SC) 
guarantees the secure environment for live VM migration 
from one Hypervisor to another; where each hypervisor 
runs a local Security Process (SP) to communicate with the 
SC. 
 2. Live VM Migration Security Evaluation: 
2.1 Analysis of Live VM Migration Security Attacks: 
The live VM migration process is prone to active and 
passive attacks. Attacks on the live VM migration process 
are categorized into control plane, data plane and migration 
module classes [1]. 
2.1.1 Control Plane:  
Hypervisor operations such as initiation and 
management of live VM migration should be authenticated 
and resistant against tampering. Furthermore, protection 
against spoofing and replays attack should be provided. 
The various vulnerabilities and threats on the control plane 
are identified as following: 
 Incoming Migration Control: 
By initiating unauthorized incoming migrations, an 
attacker may cause guest VMs to be live migrated 
to the attacker’s machine and gain full control over 
guest VMs. 
 Outgoing Migration Control: 
Similarly, by initiating outgoing migrations, an 
attacker may migrate a large number of guest VMs 
to a legitimate victim Hypervisor, overloading it 
and causing disruptions or denial of service. 
 False Resource Advertising: 
In an environment where live migrations are 
automatically initiated to distribute load across a 
number of servers, an attacker may be able to 
advertise falsely about available resources via the 
control plane. The attacker may be able to 
influence the control plane to migrate a VM to a 
compromised Hypervisor. 
2.1.2 Data Plane:  
Live VM Migration occurs in this plane, memory 
contents such as kernel states and application data transfer 
from one physical server to another. Attacker can use ARP 
spoofing or DNS poisoning techniques to launch Man in 
the Middle (MITM) attack on insecure communication 
channel. This introduces active and passive attacks during 
the migration process. Therefore, secure and protected 
channel must be used to minimize snooping and tampering 
attempts on migration data. The various vulnerabilities and 
threats on data plane are identified as following: 
 Passive Snooping: 
Passive attacks against the data plane may result a 
leakage of sensitive information. By monitoring 
the migration transit path and associated network 
stream, an attacker can extract information from 
the memory of the migrating VM such as 
passwords, keys, application data, and other 
protected resources. 
 Active Manipulation: 
One of the most severe attacks, an inline attacker 
may manipulate the memory of a VM as it is 
migrated across the network such as a Man-in-the-
Middle attack may result in a complete and covert 
compromise of the guest OS. 
2.1.3 Migration Module: 
VM Migration functionality of hypervisor is 
implemented by software component which is known as 
the migration module. Vulnerabilities in migration module 
may allow attacker to compromise the hypervisor and any 
guest OSes as well. The Hypervisor component that 
implements live migration functionality must also be 
resilient to attacks. As the migration module provides a 
network service over which a VM is transferred, common 
software vulnerabilities such as stack, heap, and integer 
overflows can be exploited by a remote attacker to subvert 
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the hypervisor. Given that VM migration may not 
commonly be viewed as a publicly exposed service, the 
code of the migration module may not be scrutinized as 
thoroughly as other codes. If an attacker is able to 
compromise a hypervisor through its migration module, the 
integrity of any guest VMs running within the hypervisor, 
and any VMs that are migrated to that hypervisor in the 
future, may also become compromised. 
2.2 Security Requirements for VM Migration: 
We have identified the following security requirements 
for the live VM migration process [2]. 
1. Integrity Verification of Platform: 
The destination platform cryptographically identifies 
itself to source for trust establishment.  
2. Authentication: 
Attacker can launch MITM attack using techniques 
such as route hijacking or ARP poisoning in the 
migration process. In order to avoid MITM attacks on 
live VM migration, source and destination platforms 
must mutually authenticate each other.  
3. Authorization (Access control policies): 
Appropriate access control policies must be provided 
to secure the live VM migration process. An 
unauthorized user/role may launch VM initiate, 
migration operation. Unauthorized activities can be 
prevented by using access control list (ACL's). 
4. Confidentiality and Integrity of VM during migration: 
An encrypted channel must be established so that an 
attacker cannot get any information from VM contents 
and modification of contents can be properly detected. 
This will help to avoid active attacks such as memory 
manipulation on live migration and passive attacks 
such as leakage of sensitive information.  
5. Replay Resistance: 
Attacker can capture traffic and replay it later to get 
authenticated in VM migration process. Therefore, live 
VM migration process should be replay resistant. 
Nonce's can be used to prevent replay attack in 
migration. 
6. Source Non-Repudiation: 
Source host cannot deny from VM migration 
operation. This feature can be achieved by using Public 
key certificate. 
3. Related Work: 
One approach for secure live VM migration against 
attacks discussed is to assign a small group of VMs or even 
a single VM to its own host-based Virtual LAN (VLAN) 
[3]. VLAN is basically a segmentation and isolation tool. 
The VLAN isolates migration traffic from other network 
traffic and defines a secure transmission channel for 
migration. A major drawback of VLAN-based security 
approach is the growth in complexity and administrative 
costs as the VM population grows. The complexity lies in 
setting up and maintaining VLANs for each VM, 
synchronizing VLANs, configuring the virtual and 
physical switches, troubleshooting and fix configuration 
errors, manage the growth and complexity of ACLs as 
number of VMs increased, ensure compatibility between 
physical network and virtual network security policies. 
VLAN-based security approach does not support for any of 
security requirement. 
Network Security Engine-Hypervisor (NSE-H) 
approach [4] is based on hypervisors included with 
network security engines to eradicate intrusions occurring 
in virtual network. So, protecting virtual machine (VM) 
residing in virtual network. NSE includes firewall, 
intrusion detection systems and intrusion prevention 
system to provide security to virtualized environment. 
They include intelligent packet processing capability built 
in them. The NSE firewall work in state full way. They 
maintain security context for each packet and make 
decisions based on security context and packet content. but 
the downtime is increased according to two factors. The 
first is that the SC iterative copy processing. The second is 
that SC migration process competes with VM migration 
process for computing resources, and this slows down VM 
migration process. This approach does not support for any 
of security requirement.  
Role based migration approach [2,5] is based on use of 
Intel vPro and TPM hardware for protection of migration 
process. It consists of Attestation Service, Seal Storage, 
Policy Service, Migration Service and Secure Hypervisor 
Components. These features help the scheme to secure 
Virtual Machine during migrations between open 
platforms. Secure migration includes three key steps, 
which are building trustworthy container for virtual 
machine, securing VM Migration, and securing hypervisor. 
The drawback of role-based secure migration; it cannot be 
integrated with current deployed infrastructure because 
changes are required at software and hardware levels. 
Virtual TPM -vTPM based migration protocol [2,6] is 
the integration of Trusted Computing technologies into 
virtualized computing environments enables the hardware-
based protection of private information and detection of 
malicious software. Their use in virtual platforms, 
however, requires appreciate virtualization of their main 
component, the Trust Platform Module (TPM) by means of 
virtual TPMs (vTPM). The challenge here is that the use of 
TPM virtualization should not impede classical platform 
processes such as VM migration. In fact, there is typically 
a single TPM module per hardware platform. Therefore, its 
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functionality has to be efficiently shared by the virtual 
machines (VM) running on the same hardware. This is 
typically achieved by virtual TPMs (VTPMs) that mimic 
the interface and functionality of the hardware TPM. One 
important challenge is to realize vTPM that comply with 
TPM specifications while not impeding platform processes 
such as VM migration. The main drawbacks are: it is not 
support live migration and the keys of vTPM are stored 
outside the TMP, therefore prone to leakage and 
unauthorized modification. The vTPM state is also 
migrated, so it is an overhead and increases the downtime 
and total migration time and performance decreasing. This 
approach does not support authorization security 
requirement. 
VM Migration using SSH tunnel between proxies is 
the approach [7] proposed by consisting of inter cloud 
proxies, secure channel between proxies, migration with 
non-shared storage and virtual network migration 
components. Inter cloud proxies used to restrict access to 
those hosts which are used in inter cloud VM mobility. The 
proxy server at the source and destination clouds 
communicates with each other and hides the details of 
source and destination Cloud hosts. SSH tunnel is 
established between proxies for secure VM migration, VM 
states and memory is transferred during the migration 
process. The main drawback of this approach is not support 
authorization; Furthermore it requires port forwarding on 
firewalls. 
RSA with SSL [8] based Secure VM migration process 
is consists of three steps. First, load calculation on physical 
host then RSA with SSL protocol is used for authentication 
and encryption mechanism as well as for protection and 
privacy of memory contents. Finally, Pre-copy or Post-
copy migration techniques used for live migration between 
source and destination. The drawbacks of this approach: 
RSA based authentication required public keys of all 
hypervisors for authentication in migration process. So, the 
management of Public keys difficult. This approach does 
not comply with authorization and integrity verification of 
platform. This approach increases the migration time and 
degrades the performance. Trusted Token (TT) based 
migration approach [9] consists of set policy, implement 
migration policy and audit migration components. User's 
policy contains the acceptable Trust Assurance Level 
(TAL) value of the target cloud platform for VM 
migration. TT is a trust credential which contains TAL 
value issued by Platform Trust Assurance Authority 
(PTTA) based on hardware and software components of 
platform. VM migration occurs if TAL value in TT of 
destination platform is acceptable against the TAL value of 
user migration policy. 
X.805 security standard investigates attacks on live 
virtual machine migration [10]. The analysis highlights the 
main source of threats and suggests approaches to tackle 
them.  
X.805 standard defines three security layers 
(applications, services and infrastructure), three security 
planes (end user, control and management) which are 
identified based on the activities performed over the 
network, and also eight security dimensions to address 
general system vulnerabilities (Access Control, 
Authentication, Non- Reputation, Data Confidentiality, 
Communication Security, Data Integrity, Availability, and 
Privacy). 
4. Proposed Mechanism: 
We suggest a secure architecture for live Virtual 
Machine (VM) migration through a proposed Security 
Center (SC) infrastructure which will be added to the 
Virtual Machine (VM) environment. The proposed 
mechanism should satisfy all security requirements for live 
VM migration and should be resistant to different types of 
attacks described in Live VM Migration Security 
Evaluation Section . The Architecture of Secure Live 
Migration shown in figure 1 where the SC consists of 
different modules: Access Control List (ACL), Update 
Center, Certification Authority (CA) and Auditing 
Database (ADB). The ACL is responsible for 
allowing/denying operation for each VM migration request 
and is responsible for preventing the VM migration 
flooding. Update Center is responsible for updating all 
hypervisors software in the environments, keeping them 
up-to-date and installing all available security patches by 
both periodically and manually. CA is responsible for 
storing all hypervisor certificates which are used in 
authentication, confidentiality and is responsible for 
renewing the certificate when it is expired. Finally, All the 
events should be recorded into ADB for historical and 
reporting purposes. Public keys, symmetric key, nonce, 
sequence number and hashing are techniques that will be 
used to ensure the integrity of the platform and to ensure 
that the source and destination are authenticated and 
certified the confidentiality (the details explained later). 
The proposed algorithm is divided into two parts; 
firstly; the registration part. The second part is the secure 
live (VM) migration process from Hypervisor (Hyp1) to 
Hypervisor (Hyp2) through SC. 
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Figure 1   Architecture of Secure Live Migration  
The secure live (VM) migration process passes into three 
phases as following:  
1. Hyp1 communicate with SC;  
2. SC communicate with Hyp2;  
3. Hyp1 communicate with Hyp2;  
In the registration process part, before the hypervisor 
installation finished on a physical machine, the hypervisor 
should be registered in the SC to complete the installation. 
To do it; the hypervisor should be sent to the SC a 
register_request concatenates with sequence_number (to 
protect the order) and time_stamp_random_nounce (to 
protect the reply attack and used as a hash key). The 
hashing techniques used in all messages between the 
hypervisors and SC to guarantee the message integrity. The 
SC receives the register_request and checks the integrity 
through hashing. The SC responds with SC's certificate; 
the hypervisor stores the SC certificate and extracts the SC 
public key. Now, the hypervisor is responsible for creating 
a local Security Process (SP) which has a specific SP ID. 
The local SP is responsible for providing a secure manner 
to exchange all messages with the SC and migration traffic 
with other SPs on other hypervisors. After the SP creation, 
the SP collects the hypervisor information (HI) for 
example, IP address, MAC Address, SP ID and hypervisor 
version. SP uses this information to generate a hypervisor 
certificate and store the private key locally. Only SP has a 
permission to read the private key. The SP creates a new 
message containing its certificate encrypted by SC public 
key (only SC can decrypt it) concatenated with HI which 
is signed by the hypervisor private key and encrypted the 
signed message by SC public key (only SC can decrypt it 
which certifies the confidentiality and the sign process 
certifies the hypervisor authentication which ensures the 
message is coming only from this hypervisor because the 
hypervisor is the only which has its private key) .Also 
concatenated with sequence_number and 
time_stamp_random_nounce. Now; SP is ready to send 
this message to the SC. 
The SC receives a message, extracts the hypervisor 
certificate and public key and creates a new record for the 
hypervisor into CA module including (Hyp ID, local SP 
ID, digital certificate, certificate status, certificate age, IP 
address, MAC address and Hypervisor software version). 
The SC sends OK_registered message back to the 
hypervisor to confirm the completed registration process. 
The OK_registered was encrypted using the hypervisor 
public key. 
When launching a new VM on a hypervisor, the 
administrator should create a proper record into the ACL 
table into SC to control the VM Migration operations. As 
shown in table 1, the example of SC ACL table, the 
destination hypervisor is the result of the other function 
like CalculateLoad() which returns a trust (registered in 
SC) hypervisor with lowest load.  
 













Otherwise deny  
 
In the ACL table, the Age field is required to prevent 
migration flooding of specific VM more than once in 
specific interval. So, the migration requests for specific 
VM should not occur more than once in specific interval. 
This interval needs other experiments to determine it. 
When generating a new migration request, the Age value 
is set. So, any new migration request for the same VM will 
not be allowed during this interval. 
In secure live VM migration process part, the first step 
is starting when the source hypervisor communicates with 
SC through the hypervisor local SP. Hypervisor activates 
the local SP. The SP sends migration_request including 
(SP ID, VM ID, user) which is signed by the hypervisor 
private key and the signed message is encrypted by the SC 
public key. SP concatenates the requested message with SP 
ID, sequence_number and time_stamp_random_nounce. 
The SP sends this message to the SC. 
The SC receives the message and checks ACL. If it is 
OK, then SC sets the Age value and continues with lookup 
into CA table to match the received SP ID with SP ID 
record which is previously stored; then determines the 
specific certificate and extracts the source hypervisor 
public key. SC decrypts the message with the SC private 
key and unsign it with the source hypervisor public key. 
Then it checks the updated center module; the destination 
hypervisor software version should be equal or higher than 
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the source version. If not, update the destination hypervisor 
version through destination local SP. After that, the SC 
generates symmetric Session Key (s_key) to encrypt all 
traffics between source and destination. We proposed 
symmetric key encryption because it is more efficient and 
faster than public/private keys. 
The SC creates ACK message including s_key which 
is signed by the SC private key and encrypted the signed 
message by source hypervisor public key, concatenated 
this message with, sequence_number and 
time_stamp_random_nounce. The SC sends the ACK 
message back to source hypervisor. Now the source SP has 
an s_key and changes its mode into wait_mode for waiting 
ready_message from the SC. 
The second step, the SC communicates with the 
destination hypervisor through the destination hypervisor 
SP. The SC creates a ready_migrate_request including 
(source SP ID, VM ID, user, source IP, s_key) which is 
signed by the SC private key and the signed message is 
encrypted by the destination hypervisor public key which 
is got from CA table on SC. This requested message is 
concatenated with sequence_number and 
time_stamp_random_nounce. The SC sends it to the 
destination SP on the destination hypervisor. Now, the 
source and destination SP have the s_key to encrypt all 
migration traffic with pre-copy migration method. 
The destination SP creates ready_message which is 
signed by the destination hypervisor private key and the 
signed message is encrypted with the SC public key. This 
message is concatenated with sequence_number and 
time_stamp_random_nounce. This message is sent to the 
SC. 
The SC receives the ready_message and is signed by 
the SC private key and the signed message is encrypted 
with source hypervisor public key. This message is 
concatenated with sequence_number and 
time_stamp_random_nounce. This message is sent to the 
source SP. The SC starts monitoring the migration process 
and begins counting down the Age value in ACL table. 
The source SP receives ready_message and creates 
hello_message which is encrypted with s_key. This 
message is concatenated with sequence_number and 
time_stamp_random_nounce. This message is sent to the 
destination SP. The destination SP receives hello_message 
and responds with a new hello_message which is 
encrypted with s_key. This message is concatenated with 
sequence_number and time_stamp_random_nounce. This 
message is sent to the source SP. 
The source SP receives the hello_message and validates it. 
Now, the source SP starts the secure live VM migration 
using pre-copy. All traffics of the VM migration 
transmission are encrypted with s_key symmetric 
encryption algorithm to exchange the migration traffic 
between hypervisors. 
5. Security Analysis and Discussion: 
The proposed algorithm discusses different types of 
security issues related to live VM migration process.  
A. Incoming Migration Control: means initiating 
unauthorized incoming migrations. The proposed 
algorithm solves it by proposing access control list 
module (ACL) to determine the authorized users who 
have permission to initiate the migration.  
B. Outcoming migration control: means migrating a 
large number of guest VMs to a legitimate victim 
Hypervisor, overloading it and causing disruptions or a 
denial of service. The proposed solution is to create the 
Age value into the ACL table to prevent the flooding 
of VM migration requests. Also the destination 
hypervisor is determined by the CalculateLoad() 
function which returns a trust hypervisor with lowest 
load. 
C. False Resource Advertisement: means the attacker 
may be able to falsely advertise available resources. 
The proposed algorithm  
solves it by the registration stage, which guarantees all 
trust and healthy hypervisors had been registered into 
SC and all migration processes will occur only through 
SC.  
D. Passive Attack: causes leakage of sensitive 
information by monitoring the migration transit path 
and associated network stream. The proposed 
algorithm is resistant to the passive attack by providing 
a secure manner by an asymmetric encryption 
algorithm to exchange all messages between 
hypervisors and the SC. As well as using  
E. Active Attack (Man-in-the-Middle): means the 
attackers have the ability to intercept messages 
between the source and the destination. The proposed 
algorithm resists the active attack by using hashing 
techniques to detect any manipulating into memory of 
a VM as it is migrated across the network. In addition, 
all messages are signed by the sender's private key and 
then encrypted using the receiver's public key to certify 
the concept of mutual authentication.  
F. Migration Module Bugs: means the migration module 
has common software vulnerabilities such as stack, 
heap, and integer overflows which can be exploited by 
a remote attacker to subvert the hypervisor. The 
proposed algorithm solves it by Update Center Module 
into SC which is responsible for keeping all registered 
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hypervisors up-to-date and installing all available 
security patches on the hypervisors when updated. 
G. Integrity Verification of Platform: means the 
platform cryptographically identifies itself to other for 
trust establishment. The proposed algorithm solves it 
by the registration stage where each hypervisor 
identifies itself with its certificate to the SC and creates 
a specific record for each hypervisor into CA. 
H. Authentication: The proposed algorithm designs the 
authentication through an encryption by private keys. 
When the message is signed by the sender's private key 
,it guarantees the sender because he, and only he, is the 
owner of the private key. 
I. Confidentiality: means a privacy; the proposed 
algorithm solves it through encryption by the public 
key. When the message is encrypted by the receiver's 
public key, that guarantees only the receiver has the 
ability to decrypt the message because he, and only he, 
is the owner of private key. Another technique used is 
a symmetric encryption key to encrypt all migration 
traffics between the source and destination 
hypervisors.  
J. Replay Attack Resistant: means attacker can capture 
traffic and replay it later to get authenticated in VM 
migration process. The nonce's are used to prevent 
replay attacks in migration, which is combined with a 
time stamp in our proposed algorithm. 
K. Auditing: The proposed algorithm provides an auditing 
database for recording all events for historical and 
reporting purposes. This database is hosted into SC. 
Conclusion and Future Work: 
In this paper, we highlight a number of proposed 
mechanisms for secure live migration and discuss the 
advantages and disadvantages of each one . We show that 
our proposed mechanisms which satisfy all security 
requirements and treat most attacks on live VM process ; 
however, we have complemented the existing work which 
use Security Center (SC) to guarantee the secure 
environment for live migration from one Hypervisor to 
another; where each hypervisor runs a local Security 
Process (SP) to communicate with the SC. The SC is 
responsible for all security requirements and has CA 
module to manage the Hypervisor's certificates. For 
authentication; the messages are signed with the sender's 
private key. For messages integrity; the messages are 
hashed (digitized). For authorization, the SC has ACL 
module. For confidentiality, the messages are encrypted by 
symmetric key encryption where it is more efficient than 
Asymmetric key encryption. For reply attack resistance, 
we used nonce's and time stamp. For auditing, all events 
will be recorded into ADB. However, the implementation 
and actual performance evaluation of the proposed 
algorithm are left for future work.  
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